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Abstract—Managing privacy in mobile instant messaging is a
challenge for designers and users alike. If too many options are
provided, the privacy controls can become complex to understand
and unwieldy to manipulate. Conversely, providing too few
controls leaves users without the ability to adequately express
their privacy preferences. Further complicating this, a new class
of social networks has emerged where one person can add another
without mutual consent (i.e. Tumbler, Twitter, and WhatsApp).
We present a survey of 626 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Saudi)
WhatsApp users to determine their privacy-related behaviors and
opinions. We find that Saudi users were aware of the privacy
settings and use them especially to limit the visibility of when they
were last active. We also find that 83.9% of respondents had been
contacted by a stranger through the application. Respondents
wanted more control over their membership in groups and the
resulting visibility of their private profile information such as
phone numbers. We discuss the results in terms of prior privacy
and interruptibility awareness literature.
I. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of Mobile Instant Messaging (MIM) ap-
plications has been markedly increasing in recent years as a
way to cheaply stay connected with friends and family. MIM
applications such as WhatsApp, Google Hangouts, Facebook
Messenger, and Snapchat allow users to easily send text
messages, videos, links, and photos. They also enable the
maintenance of online communities through the use of group
pages and multi-party chat features. However, the visibility of
users’ personal information to other users on these networks
leads to privacy concerns. To help counter these issues, appli-
cations provide privacy features and settings that can be used to
manage the visibility of information. However, these controls
do not always a match to users’ expectations and needs.
While the use of MIM enables easier communication,
it also brings with it privacy issues inherent in Computer
Mediated Communication (CMC) such as how to limit the
visibility of information to intended audiences. CMC applica-
tions also suffer from privacy concerns around controlling and
disseminating awareness or presence information [27]. Even
though they are using MIM to communicate information to
others, users still have an expectation of privacy. Prior work
has found that users of CMC technologies such as WhatsApp
use them to effectively collaborate with others at work [37], but
still want to limit the sharing of awareness type information
such as location to specific groups in specific contexts. For
example, sharing location information with co-workers only
during work hours while sharing the same information with
spouses all the time [9], [28].
Privacy also varies depending on cultures [38]. Studies
have found that culture has a huge impact on online privacy
concerns [5], the pattern of use of social networks [35], and
the SNS privacy policies [6]. Most cultural privacy research
focuses on Western cultures, with minimal research done with
Middle Eastern cultures. In this work, we are interested in
how users of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) manage their
privacy in an application that provides simplified coarse grain
privacy controls to users. We selected WhatsApp because the
application is very popular in many countries [14], including
KSA, and puts a strong emphasis on being simple and easy to
use. This design philosophy has resulted in two interesting
choices: 1) coarse grain control options, and 2) one-sided
connections where one person can add another person as a
connection without the other person’s notification or approval.
These features lead us to focus on the following research
questions:
R1: How do Saudi users control access to their in-
formation using WhatsApp settings? In particular,
we are interested in users’ awareness of privacy
issues on WhatsApp, the privacy setting choices
they make, and their opinions about the privacy
options available to them.
R2: How do Saudi users manage issues associated
with one-sided connections? In particular, we are
interested in three issues with one-sided connec-
tions: unwanted contact through the application,
being added to a chat group without permission,
and blocking as a way to manage one-sided con-
nections.
We administered a survey about privacy setting usage
on WhatsApp and the avalible opinions regarding WhatsApp
privacy. The survey was sent to WhatsApp users in KSA using
a snowball sample methodology.
We found that: 1) Setting simplicity was generally liked
by respondents; however, they also wanted the ability to limit
the visibility of information to specific people. 2) Respondents
wanted to be asked before being added to a group. 3) Contact
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Fig. 1: WhatsApp conversation between two users (iOS ver-
sion).
from strangers was an issue for 83.9% of respondents. 4)
Though males and females used the blocking feature to control
unwanted contact from both strangers and known contacts,
women tended to block strangers more often than men. We
conclude with a discussion of these results and the limitation
of our work.
II. WHATSAPP
WhatsApp Messenger is a cross-platform mobile messag-
ing application launched in 2009. It was initially designed as
a text messaging application, but its current version allows
for the creation of groups, sending media (images, audio and
video), sharing of contacts details, and sharing the user’s loca-
tion. The current application allows communication between
two or more users (Figure 1) where chat histories are recorded
and visible to all parties.
WhatsApp is popular in several countries, it is an inexpen-
sive form of communication because of the phone’s ability to
use free wireless access points or existing data plans to send
messages, easy to use due to its simplistic interface, and ad
free [8], [32].
WhatsApp is continuously altering the way privacy is
managed on the application. The following describes the
functionality of WhatsApp at the time of the study (November,
2014).
WhatsApp uses phone numbers to uniquely identify users.
When a user first signs-up with WhatsApp, she has to pro-
vide and verify her phone number. This becomes her unique
identifier on the application.
The contacts list on WhatsApp is drawn directly from the
phone’s contact list. After setup, WhatsApp reads the contact
list on the user’s phone and automatically adds all her contacts
who are on WhatsApp to her WhatsApp contact list. If she
wants to connect with another WhatsApp user she must add
that person’s phone number to her phone’s contact list which
automatically adds the person as a contact on WhatsApp. The
Fig. 2: WhatsApp Group Chat where phone numbers are shown
for members who are not a part of the phone contact list and
members names are shown for the members on the phone
contact list.
only way to remove someone from WhatsApp’s full list of
contacts is to delete them from the phone’s list of contacts.
Mutual consent is not required to add someone as a
contact. If Bob adds Alice as a contact he can immediately
contact her and see her profile information as soon as he has
added her. Alice does not need to provide any explicit consent
for this to happen and Alice cannot see that Bob has added
her to his contact list.
Phone numbers are visible to all members of a Group
Chat. A Group Chat is a conversation amongst a group of
WhatsApp users. Each message sent to the Group Chat is sent
to everyone who is a member of that chat. Anyone can create
a new Group Chat and add up to 49 other users. Added users
are immediately included in the group without mutual consent
and notified about their new membership. The existing Group
Chat members will see a message that a new member joined
the group. Membership is visible to all participants. Mutual
authentication is not needed to add a user, but they may leave
the group at any time. Doing so will trigger a message sent
to the whole group stating: “[User] left.” All group members
can see the phone numbers of all other group members.
Communications from people not in the local phone’s contact
list appear as phone numbers in the Group Chat (Figure 2).
The only way to prevent communication is by blocking.
Anyone with a user’s phone number can contact her through
WhatsApp. The only way to prevent contact is by blocking the
other user. Blocking a user will prevent all future contact and
hide all future edits to profile information.
Profile information is visible to all users by default. Anyone
who has the user as a contact can by default view her profile
information which includes the profile photo, status, and when
she was last using the application (last seen). The user has
the ability to limit the visibility of her profile information to
”Everyone”, ”My Contacts”, and ”Nobody” (Figure 3).
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Fig. 3: WhatsApp privacy settings management interface at
the time of the study (iOS version). Left: Privacy management
screen. Right: Available options for Last Seen, Profile Photo,
and Status.
Users can see when messages are delivered and read. Orig-
inally WhatsApp only provided information about message
delivery to all users but three days before the study they added
a feature that allows people to see when messages have been
read which they refer to as ”Read Receipts”. As can be seen
in Figure 4, the Read Receipt feature allows a user to see who
has received their messages and when those messages were
received and read. At the time of the study there was no way
to turn this feature off.
III. RELATED WORK
A. Managing permissions.
Ideally a user should be able to post information to an
online community and be assured that her information will
only be shared with those people whom she wished to share
with. In practice, users can have difficulty understanding the
complex permission options available to them leading them to
make errors, which puts their data at risk of unintended disclo-
sure [11], [20]. Studies on Online Social Networks (OSN) have
observed a lack of awareness about privacy settings among
Facebook users [1], [18]. While some users were not aware
of Facebook privacy settings, others did not know where the
privacy settings were located, or that they existed at all [1],
[11].
People have complex ever-shifting social groups which
can be challenging to track using manual grouping [19].
Additionally, many access-control management systems found
in OSN require the user to construct groups of people and
assign abilities to the groups.
Another study of Facebook and its privacy illustrated that
groups that users were least comfortable with are not just
limited to strangers, or people who are not members of the
persons network, but also include other groups such as people
the user has never met in person, coworkers, and friends of
friends [17]. Privacy concerns have also been found to vary
Fig. 4: WhatsApp ”Read Receipts” in a Group Chat (iOS
version).
by gender. Studies about privacy on OSN have also noticed
that women are more likely to have private profiles [22] and
use privacy settings tool than men [18].
B. Privacy in Instant Messaging (IM).
IM users have three main points of privacy concern: privacy
from non-contacts, privacy regarding availability, and privacy
regarding the content of IM communication [27]. The majority
of people are concerned about the types of information dis-
played to people outside their intended audience [17], [23].
Online social networks such as Facebook have endeavored
to address these concerns by providing privacy controls to
end users that, enabling them to control who can see what
information.
Profile information such as when the person was last logged
in, their current status, or current location provides information
that is potentially useful to other people who might want to
communicate with them. While there is a natural inclination
to hide such information for privacy reasons, sharing it also
enables improved coordination with other people. Patil and
Lai found that office workers found sharing this type of
information during work hours to be both acceptable from a
privacy perspective and beneficial to work coordination [9],
[28]. They also found that people were happy to share this
information with their family as well, but without the work
hours restrictions [28].
C. WhatsApp privacy and security.
Security and privacy have been an ongoing issue for
WhatsApp with several researchers identifying security is-
sues [10], [31]. In 2013 the Office of the Privacy Commissioner
of Canada (OPC) determined that WhatsApp was breaching
privacy laws [24]. Although WhatsApp worked on some of
these violations (e.g. messages encryption, sharing of status
messages and presence), some are still in existence.
WhatsApp was initially used to communicate with close
friends and sometimes family [8]. Even more recent studies
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have found that people tend to use it to communicate with
tightly connected groups of people in small geographical
areas [25]. WhatsApp self describes itself as using “your
phones Internet connection to message and call friends and
family” [15]. However, as WhatsApp becomes more popular
and more ubiquitous it is being used for all sorts of purposes
such as sharing medical information [37], helping students
learn to read [30], and sharing documents [7].
Church and Oliveira investigated the Last Seen feature in
WhatsApp. This feature allows Alice, for example, to know the
last time her contact Bob opened WhatsApp. The research il-
lustrated that the recipient feels pressure to respond, regardless
of the urgency of the sender. ”If I send a WhatsApp to him, I
check for the 2 ticks and if I don’t get a reply, then I think but
he read it!” While some users see this as an invasion to their
privacy “I don’t like it very much because if I don’t want to
answer straight away, I don’t want them to know that I’ve seen
the message”, others rely on the immediacy of the program
“It doesn’t need to be answered in that moment but I know
you’re going to read it” [8]. In another study using WhatsApp
O’Hara et al. [25] talked about how different patterns of using
awareness and notifications provided by WhatsApp (e.g. last
seen and double checks) create accountabilities and raise the
issue of moral implications for the application design. While
some users see last seen as invitation to talk others do not see
it as a notation of availability.
D. Culture and privacy
User privacy preferences and behaviors may vary depend-
ing on, for example, gender, culture, region or religion. In
their research, Zakaria, Stanton, & Sarkar-Barney illustrated
that cultural values play an important role in how people
manage privacy issues [38]. They depended on the culture
values framework developed by Halls to discuss the differences
between low-context cultures (e.g. United States, Germen, and
English) and high-context cultures (e.g. Arab, Indian, Spanish,
and Asian) and how these differences could relate to privacy. A
study for Wang et al. [36] found that American social network
users have more privacy concerns than their Chinese and Indian
counterparts, and what they considered as private information
differs between cultures.
Culture can also have a strong impact on how men and
women interact involving technology. Work on security and
privacy of banking in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has shown
that men and women have different types of expectations
around the sharing of potentially private information such as
banking PIN numbers [2]. Research on empowering women
in developing countries through technology also highlights
the need to take culture and privacy into account. Shroff
and Kam recommend that applications aimed at women in
developing countries be designed so the user interface evolves
as the women becomes more accustomed to using the tech-
nology [33]. Women in these areas often start out unsure and
unwilling to take an active participating role. As they become
more accustom to interacting with the technology they become
more willing to take a proactive role; the user interface needs
to support this transition.
IV. METHODOLOGY
A web-based survey was used to elicit user behaviors
and perceptions relating to the use of WhatsApp. The survey
focused mainly on privacy issues surrounding the management
of profile information and the ways people communicate using
WhatsApp. Several questions in the survey also addressed
attitudes and behaviors regarding unwanted communication
based on how WhatsApp uses the phone number as an user
ID. The survey was written in English and one of the authors,
native speaker of Arabic, translated the survey into Arabic.
Both versions of the survey were tested by native speakers in
both languages.
A. Survey Design
The survey contained 42 questions, the majority of which
were multiple choice and Likert scale questions. It was com-
prised of: 5 demographics questions; 5 questions about what
MIMs respondents have/are using and reasons of downloading
those MIMs; 6 questions about WhatsApp usage; 13 questions
asking about the respondents current non-privacy settings in
the app (e.g. chat backup, auto download, and read receipts)
and their opinions/knowledge about them; 4 questions asking
respondents about blocking features and why they have used
them; 3 questions asking them if they had been contacted
by stranger(s) using WhatsApp; 3 questions that asked the
respondents to specify their current privacy settings in the app
and why they chose these settings; 1 question which had a 5-
point Likert scale that asked the respondents to indicate their
degree of agreement with 19 statements about WhatsApp; and
finally the last 2 questions asked the respondents about the
feature(s) that they dislike the most in the current version of
the app and the feature(s) that they would like to see. The end
of the survey had a free text comment box. All the questions
were based on how WhatsApp functioned at the time of the
survey and its privacy settings. Differences between different
OS platforms were taken into account.
B. Sampling Methodology
Participants who responded to the survey were recruited
using a snowball sampling methodology through WhatsApp
itself. Participants did not receive any compensation. The
participants were informed that we are studying WhatsApp
privacy settings and the work was approved by our IRB.
The first author is a citizen of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
and was able to use her existing WhatsApp contact list to
advertise the survey to Saudi users of WhatsApp. The initial
seed was encouraged to share the survey with other contacts.
She also posted advertisements for the survey on public social
networking pages for Saudis in the United States.
C. Sample Demographics
A total of 1238 respondents accessed the online survey,
and 945 respondents completed it. Most respondents identified
themselves as Arab (Saudi)(74.4%, n=626), while (22.75%,
n=215) were Arab, (2.43%, n=23) were Indian, (1.48%, n=14)
were American, (1.27%, n=12) were Asian, and (5.92%, n=56)
chose not to identify themselves. In this study we focus our
analysis on the 626 respondents who completed the survey
and identified themselves as Saudis. 137 (21.88%) of our
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Group Always Often Rarely Never No Answer
Family 65.2% 27.6% 6.4% 0.5% 0.3%
Friends 59.9% 29.4% 8.1% 0.5% 2.1%
Co-Workers 26.8% 30.8% 28.9% 10.1% 3.4%
Others 4.5% 7.8% 33.2% 52.1% 2.4%
TABLE I: How often respondents contact each group through
WhatsApp (percentage of respondents).
respondents were aged 18-24, 290 (46.33%) were aged 25-
30, 133 (21.25%) were aged 31-40, 55 (8.79%) were 41+
and 11 (1.76%) chose not to indicate an age. The majority
of the respondents were women (64.54%, n=404), and about
a third were men (31.79%, n=199), with (3.67%, n=23) chose
not to indicate a gender. We asked the respondents about
their current employment status 240 (28.54%) were graduate
students, 199 (23.66%) were employed, 192 (22.83%) were
undergrad students, 155 (18.43%) were not employed, and 55
(6.54%) chose not to indicate a status.
V. RESULTS
A. WhatsApp Usage
Most respondents (93.61%, n=586) used WhatsApp on
a daily basis to connect with others. Table I shows how
often respondents contacted different social groups includ-
ing Friends, Family, Co-workers and Others who appear on
their contact list such as drivers, plumbers, and contractors.
They contacted Always or Often most frequently with family
(92.8%, n=581) followed by friends (89.3%, n=559). They
were less consistent for co-workers reporting contact Always,
Often, and Rarely with nearly equal frequencies. The Never
option was also selected by 10.1% (n=63). While 16.6%
(n=104) were unemployed it is likely that they may have had
co-workers through volunteer work or in a past employment.
People rarely contacted people in the Other group, with 52.1%
(n=326) indicating that they never contacted people in this
group through WhatsApp at all. These results are consistent
with earlier work which found that people consider WhatsApp
to be an informal form of communication best suited for
contacting friends and family [8].
We asked respondents what type of information they used
WhatsApp to send to their contacts. They sent text messages
(88%, n=551), images (82%, n=515), links to information
such as news (77%, n=480), videos (71%, n=447), contact
information (58%, n=361), and their location (44%, n=278).
When asked if they regularly used WhatsApp to send sensitive
content 53.4% (n = 334) indicated Strongly Agree or Agree.
B. Awareness and Use of Settings
We asked respondents to report their current WhatsApp
privacy settings. The majority (58.98%) of respondents had
changed at least one setting. As can be seen in Table II, 46.6%
decided to completely hide their last seen timestamps, and
11.7% decided to limit visibility to My Contacts. However,
many users elected to leave their profile photo and status
visible to either Everyone or My Contacts with only 2.4%
and 3.8% completely removing the visibility of their profile
photo and status respectively.
Group Last Seen Profile Photo Status
Everyone 46.6% 68.0% 70.0%
My Contacts 11.7% 23.5% 19.8%
Nobody 33.0% 2.4% 3.8%
I don’t have this feature 8.0% 4.3% 4.1%
No Answer 0.8% 1.8% 2.2%
TABLE II: Respondent self-reported privacy settings (percent-
age of respondents).
Profile Information Agree Neutral Disagree NA
Profile picture 43.3% 25.1% 30.7% 1.0%
Status 45.2% 25.0% 28.1% 1.8%
Last seen 47.3% 23.8% 27.3% 1.6%
TABLE III: Answers to: I want to be able to hide my
[profile information] from specific people in my contact list.
We grouped Strongly Agree and Agree under Agree and
Strongly Disagree and Disagree under Disagree (percentage
of respondents).
Based on prior work, we anticipated that respondents would
consider their last seen information to be sensitive and asked
why they chose to hide or not hide it. Respondents did not
feel that it was necessary to hide their last seen information
(44.2%, n=277). Only 4.5% (n=28) of respondents said that
they were not aware of the setting, and 4.3% (n=27) said they
did not think about this issue before.
WhatsApp provides coarse-grained control over who can
see profile photos, statuses and last seen (Figure 3). There is no
custom group setting, so users must give access to Everyone,
My Contacts, or Nobody. We asked the respondents if they
would like to exclude specific people from seeing their three
types of profile information on a 5-point Likert scale (Table
III). Respondents generally agreed that they wanted to limit
specific peoples’ ability to see their profile information (43.3%
– 47.3%).
Using a 5-point Likert scale we also asked the respondents
to indicate whether they agree or disagree that the application
should ask them before adding them to a Group Chat (i.e
friending request). The vast majority of participants agreed
that they would like to be asked before being added to a group
(80.8%, n=506 in agreement and 7.0%, n=44 against).
Respondents were very aware of privacy-related features
on WhatsApp. The survey was launched a few days after
the ”Read Receipts” feature was added for all platforms with
no way to turn it off. This feature allows the user to know
who and when others have received their message(s) and have
read or played it (e.g. voice message) (Figure 4). When we
asked respondents about this update, 95.8% (n=600) of them
indicated that they were aware of the feature. When we asked
respondents if they had used the read receipts feature or not,
17.7% (n=111) of users said that they had used it to check
who had read their messages and when, while 48.9% (n=306)
said that they only sometimes use it.
C. Managing Unwanted Contact
The majority of respondents had been contacted by
strangers previously, with 66.6% (n=417) having been con-
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Reason Women Men
He has my number but I don’t know this person 52.2% 21.6%
I have this person’s phone number, but I don’t want
him to contact me over WhatsApp
7.2% 10.6%
I don’t want him to be able to see my profile photo
and/or status
9.7% 7.0%
We are not friends anymore 4.2% 8.5%
We had a bad fight 12.9% 20.1%
No Answer 13.9% 32.2%
TABLE IV: Reasons why men and women who have blocked
someone before chose to block people. Values shown as a
percentage of women and men due to the uneven number of
female versus male respondents.
tacted more than once, 17.3% (n=108) saying they were
contacted once, and 14.2% (n=89) reporting to have never been
contacted by a stranger. We found no statistically significant
difference between men and women in the frequency of contact
by strangers. The majority of respondents 337 (53.8%) agreed
that it bothers them that a stranger can see their profile
information while 179 (28.6%) said “maybe”.
The only available way to prevent future contact from an-
other user is by using the blocking feature. The majority of the
respondents (75.1%, n=470) reported having used the blocking
feature in the past. Women (81.7% of female respondents)
were statistically more likely to use the blocking feature than
men (62.8% of male respondents) (χ2 test value of 337.57,
df = 1, p =< 0.00001, controlled by removing respondents
who were not aware of the feature or chose not to answer).
We asked respondents to select the most common reason they
block others on WhatsApp from the list of the potential reasons
shown in Table IV. We found that men and women’s reasons
for blocking were statistically significantly different (χ2 test
value of 788.13, df = 4, p =< 0.00001, controlled by removing
respondents who chose not to answer). Both genders tended
to block because the other person was a stranger, or because
they had had a fight with the person, but woman were more
likely to block strangers, and men were more likely to block
after fights.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Controlling access to profile information
Early research on doing collaborative work using Instant
Messaging applications focused on providing awareness in-
formation to contacts so that collaborators could select a
communication time when the person was not busy [26].
Systems were created that could help provide availability
information by determining contact’s availability based on
prior communication patterns [29], and automatically deter-
mining how interpretable the person was and broadcasting that
information to others [13]. However, potential communicators
tended to not limit communications based on interruptibility,
instead they used the awareness information only to determine
if the other person was present and likely to respond [13].
Understandably users developed privacy sensitivity to the
awareness information being shared [28].
WhatsApp provides users with two types of awareness
information: when the user was last seen using the application,
and if they have read a message. Our respondents were more
sensitive about sharing last seen information with others than
they were with other profile information, such as profile
photo and status. In this study we only asked about the last
seen information because the feature providing information
about when users read messages had just been released in
an update and was only available to some users. This result
is consistent with prior literature studying the concerns of
WhatsApp users, which found that users have privacy concerns
about making their availability known [8], [25]. What was
particularly interesting in our results was that while privacy
settings for all the profile information is co-located on the same
screen, many participants chose to only restrict the visibility
of the last seen information, suggesting that they view last
seen as more privacy concerning than profile photo or status
information.
WhatsApp’s all-or-nothing style of permissions settings
gives users a very coarse grain control over the size and
composition of the audience for their profile information.
People tend to have multiple facets to their interactions. For
some people those facets are highly overlapping, and for others
the facets are disjoint [12]. The simple permission design
makes the application easy to use, and it provides good support
for people who have highly overlapping facets, or people
where only members from one facet use WhatsApp. It does
not well support users who have minimally overlapping or
disjoint facets. To help handle this issue other Online Social
Networks, such as Facebook, provide users with the ability to
create custom groups or add contacts to a pre-defined “limited
access” group. Even adding two simple choices (e.g. Always
Share With and Never Share With) that override the current
settings list provides users with the ability to make exceptions
to their settings [34].
B. One-sided connections
WhatsApp was initially designed to help people communi-
cate informally with friends and family. Many of the privacy
management choices reflect this starting point of view. The
choice to use the phone number as the only information needed
to connect assumes that only people the user knows well would
have her phone number. Similarly the choice to use a one-sided
handshake to add a new contact is an example of privacy
through obscurity; access to profile information is naturally
limited as long as only people that the user knows have access
to her phone number. As long as the obscurity assumption
holds, the user gets good enough privacy and an application
that is easy to set up.
Part of the problem with using the phone number as the sole
requirement for forming a connection is that phone numbers
are not necessarily as private as they are assumed to be. What-
sApp itself supports a group chat feature where chat members
can see each others phone numbers. Similar to the obscurity
assumptions mentioned above, as long as Group Chat is used
for a small number of known contacts the visibility of phone
numbers is not an issue. The problem is that as WhatsApp
is becoming more popular, it is starting to be used for new
purposes. What was once a communication channel limited to
friends and family, started to be used for communication in
other contexts [28], [30], [37] where people who do not know
each other may end up on the same Group Chat. Additionally,
users sometimes share their own and others phone contact
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information publicly through online social media [16]. In our
own study 53% of respondents used WhatsApp to send contact
information to others. The information sharing in Group Chat
allows people who are either strangers or who have only a
passing relationship with the user to get her phone number
and start contacting her. Our respondents wanted more control
over membership in Group Chats.
Unwanted contact by strangers was a common experience
for our respondents with 83.9% of them being contacted by a
stranger. We found that Saudi women were more likely than
men to use the blocking feature after being contacted by a
stranger. This might due to the nature of relationship between
men and women in KSA. The Quran1 warns against mixing
between different sexes which could lead to “seduction and the
’evil consequences’ that might follow” [3]. Culturally, gender
separation is an implicit rule in public and private life activities
in KSA [4]. It is normal for women and men to remain
physically separated unless they are in public or with family.
Due to this, men have less opportunities to communicate with
women outside their own families. WhatsApp may seem like
a safe way to approach and communicate with women without
publicly breaking the religious and tradition rules.
Managing unwanted communications from either strangers
or known contacts puts a burden on users who have to block
each unwanted contact individually. Unwanted communica-
tions invade users’ privacy and potentially put them at risk of
stalkers who may simply keep contacting them using different
phone numbers. The only choice is to individually block
unwanted users’ phone numbers, which does not prevent future
new unwanted contacts. A female respondent explained in the
comment section that:
“I once I had to delete my phone number because
of a stalker that kept sending me messages from
different phone numbers. Blocking his numbers was
not effective. That was a breach of my privacy.”
The ability to limit communication to only an approved list
of contacts would assist users like this one. However, it might
also put a privacy configuration burden on users who may not
need the functionality making WhatsApp less user friendly.
While unwanted contact is primarily annoying, it can also
be dangerous for users. Strangers can send media files, links,
and even viruses that users might open allowing the stranger
to learn information about the user’s location or even install
software that lets them spy on the user. Almost half of our
respondents downloaded and opened media sent to them by
people that they did not know or were not sure about their
identities (8.5% Always, 40.3% Sometimes). Spam is also
becoming an issue on WhatsApp, enough so that a recent
update added a “report spam” button to flag and remove spam
related to unwanted contact from the system.
The ability to add people to groups without mutual consent
combined with the automated notification of the whole group
on exit causes social pressure to remain in groups. One
of the key privacy concerns in social networks and instant
messaging application is reputation management [21]. Users
cannot control which groups they are added to and if they do
1The central religious text of Islam.
not want to be in a group their only options are to: 1) leave
the group which causes a notification to be sent to the whole
group, or 2) remain in the group and ignore all the messages.
Taking the first option may lead to social consequences as
other group members may be upset about the user leaving the
group. Taking the second option means that the user’s phone
number and other profile information remains visible to all
group members.
VII. LIMITATION
This work makes use of a snowball sampling methodology
which, while powerful, has several important limitations. The
participants in this survey are likely to have a higher inter-
connectivity than would be seen in the general population.
Participants were also able to easily self-select in or out of
taking the survey, leading to a sample of people who are
inclined to take surveys on WhatsApp. One positive side effect
of the snowball sampling inter-connectivity is that respondents
likely received the survey URL from a friend or someone they
knew. This allowed us to draw from a sample of people who
might normally ignore requests from strangers.
The survey results also rely on self-reported settings and
behaviors. People who misunderstand their current settings
may respond based on their understanding and not look at what
their settings actually are. People may also either misremember
events or choose to respond based on what they know they
should have been doing.
Finally, because the survey was primarily advertised on
WhatsApp, our results are limited to people who are still using
the WhatsApp application. People with strong privacy concerns
regarding WhatsApp may have stopped using the application,
effectively removing them from our sample pool.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Our survey contributes to the body of literature on how
users manage their privacy using MIM applications. We con-
ducted this survey to understand how Saudi users manage their
privacy using the coarse settings in WhatsApp as well as how
they manage issues of one-sided connections.
Our work shows that Saudi users are aware of the privacy
settings, and make use of them. While some users liked the
current setting options, others want the ability to limit the
visibility of profile information to specific people in their
contact list. The majority of users want to be asked before
they are added publicly to social groups such as Group Chat.
Users use the blocking feature to control access to their
profile information or control others’ ability to contact them
using the application. We find that women and men receive
unwanted contact by strangers. However, women tend to block
unwanted contact from strangers more than men.
People are developing a greater dependence on MIM ap-
plications as their primary communication mechanism. Privacy
is therefore an important component that should be considered
by the developers of such applications. WhatsApp emphasizes
ease of contact and sharing content which which is good for
usability and adoption. But the simplicity can also make it
challenging for users to do fine grain management of their
privacy. MIM designers need to be aware that users need
7
privacy tools that empower them to control their privacy in
a way that matches their context.
REFERENCES
[1] Alessandro Acquisti and Ralph Gross. Imagined communities: Aware-
ness, information sharing, and privacy on the Facebook. In Privacy
enhancing technologies, pages 36–58, 2006.
[2] Deena Alghamdi, Ivan Flechais, and Marina Jirotka. Security practices
for households bank customers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, 2015.
[3] Mona Almunajjed. Women in Saudi Arabia Today. Palgrave Macmillan,
1997 edition edition, 1997.
[4] Roula Baki. Gender-segregated education in saudi arabia: Its impact
on social norms and the saudi labor market. Education policy analysis
archives, 12(28):n28, 2004.
[5] Steven Bellman, Eric J Johnson, Stephen J Kobrin, and Gerald L
Lohse. International differences in information privacy concerns: A
global survey of consumers. The Information Society, 20(5):313–324,
2004.
[6] Joseph Bonneau and So¨ren Preibusch. The privacy jungle: On the
market for data protection in social networks. In Economics of
information security and privacy, pages 121–167. Springer, 2010.
[7] Patient Rambe1 Crispen Chipunza. Using mobile devices to leverage
student access to collaboratively-generated resources: A case of What-
sApp instant messaging at a South African university. In International
Conference on Advanced Information and Communication Technology
for Education, 2013.
[8] Karen Church and Rodrigo de Oliveira. What’s up with WhatsApp?:
Comparing mobile instant messaging behaviors with traditional SMS. In
Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Human-computer
Interaction with Mobile Devices and Services, pages 352–361, 2013.
[9] Sunny Consolvo, Ian E. Smith, Tara Matthews, Anthony LaMarca, Jason
Tabert, and Pauline Powledge. Location disclosure to social relations:
Why, when, & what people want to share. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI
conference on Human factors in computing systems, Portland, Oregon,
USA, April 2-7 2005.
[10] Scott Coull and Kevin Dyer. Privacy failures in encrypted messaging
services: Apple imessage and beyond. Technical report, 2014.
[11] Serge Egelman, Andrew Oates, and Shiriram Krishnamurthi. Oops, I
did it again: Mitigating repeated access control errors on Facebook. In
Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems, 2011.
[12] Shelly D. Farnham and Elizabeth F. Churchill. Faceted identity, faceted
lives: Social and technical issues with being yourself online. In
Proceedings of Computer Supported Collaborative Work, 2011.
[13] James Fogarty, Jennifer Lai, and Jim Christensen. Presence versus avail-
ability: The design and evaluation of a context-aware communication
client. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 2003.
[14] GlobalWebIndex. Share of mobile internet users in selected countries
who are active whatsapp users as of 4th quarter 2014, 2014. http://www.
statista.com/statistics/291540/mobile-internet-user-whatsapp/. (Last ac-
cessed 1-12-2015).
[15] WhatsApp Inc. WhatsApp Messenger. https://play.google.com/store/
apps/details?id=com.whatsapp. (Last accessed 1-20-2015).
[16] Prachi Jain, Paridhi Jain, and Ponnurangam Kumaraguru. Call me
maybe: Understanding nature and risks of sharing mobile numbers on
online social networks. In Proceedings of the First ACM Conference
on Online Social Networks, COSN ’13, pages 101–106, New York, NY,
USA, 2013. ACM.
[17] Maritza Johnson, Serge Egelman, and Steven M. Bellovin. Facebook
and privacy: it’s complicated. In Proceedings of the 8th Symposium on
Usable Privacy and Security, 2012.
[18] Harvey Jones and Jose´ Hiram Soltren. Facebook: Threats to privacy.
Project MAC: MIT Project on Mathematics and Computing, 1:1–76,
2005.
[19] Patrick Gage Kelley, Robin Brewer, Yael Mayer, Lorrie Faith Cranor,
and Norman Sadeh. An investigation into Facebook friend grouping.
In Proceedings of 13th IFIP TC13 Conference on Human-Computer
Interaction, pages 216–233, 2011.
[20] Jennifer King, Airi Lampinen, and Alex Smolen. Privacy: Is there an
app for that? In Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, 2011.
[21] Alfred Kobsa, Sameer Patil, and Bertolt Meyer. Privacy in instant
messaging: An impression management model. In Behaviour &
Information Technology, pages 355–370, 2012.
[22] Kevin Lewis, Jason Kaufman, and Nicholas Christakis. The taste
for privacy: An analysis of college student privacy settings in an
online social network. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication,
14(1):79–100, 2008.
[23] Heather Richter Lipford, Andrew Besmer, and Jason Watson. Under-
standing privacy settings in Facebook with an audience view. In Pro-
ceedings of the 1st Conference on Usability, Psychology, and Security,
2008.
[24] Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. Report of findings inves-
tigation into the personal information handling practices of WhatsApp
inc., Jan 2013. https://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2013/2013 001 0115 e.
asp. (Last accessed 1-12-2015).
[25] Kenton P. O’Hara, Michael Massimi, Richard Harper, Simon Rubens,
and Jessica Morris. Everyday dwelling with WhatsApp. In Proceedings
of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work
& Social Computing, CSCW ’14, pages 1131–1143, New York, NY,
USA, 2014. ACM.
[26] Sameer Patil and Alfred Kobsa. The challenges in preserving privacy
in awareness systems. In Institute of Software Research, University of
California, 2003.
[27] Sameer Patil and Alfred Kobsa. Instant messaging and privacy. In
Proceedings of HCI ’04, pages 85–88, 2004.
[28] Sameer Patil and Jennifer Lai. Who gets to know what when: Config-
uring privacy permissions in an awareness application. In Proceedings
of the SIGCHI ’05 conference on Human factors in computing systems,
pages 101–110, New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM.
[29] Martin Pielot, Rodrigo de Oliveira, Haewoon Kwak, and Nuria Oliver.
Didn’t you see my message?: Predicting attentiveness to mobile instant
messages. In Proceedings of the 32Nd Annual ACM Conference on
Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI ’14, pages 3319–3328, New
York, NY, USA, 2014. ACM.
[30] Mar Gutie´rrez-Colon Plana, Marı´a Isabel Gibert Escofet, Idoia Triana
Figueras, Ana Gimeno, Christine Appel, and Joseph Hopkins. Improv-
ing learners’ reading skills through instant short messages: A sample
study using WhatsApp. pages 80–84, 2013.
[31] Sebastian Schrittwieser, Peter Fru¨hwirt, Peter Kieseberg, Manuel Lei-
thner, Martin Mulazzani, Markus Huber, and Edgar R Weippl. Guess
who’s texting you? evaluating the security of smartphone messaging
applications. In Proceedings of the 19th Annual Symposium on Network
and Distributed System Security, 2012.
[32] Richard Shambare. The adoption of WhatsApp: Breaking the vicious
cycle of technological poverty in south africa. Journal of Economics &
Behavioral Studies, 6(7), 2014.
[33] Geeta Shroff and Matthew Kam. Towards a design model for women’s
empowerment in the developing world. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pages 2867–
2876, 2011.
[34] The Telegram Team. Hiding last seen time - done right, November 2014.
https://telegram.org/blog/privacy-revolution. (Last accessed 1-20-2015).
[35] Asimina Vasalou, Adam N Joinson, and Delphine Courvoisier. Cultural
differences, experience with social networks and the nature of “true
commitment” in Facebook. International Journal of Human-Computer
Studies, 68(10):719–728, 2010.
[36] Yang Wang, Gregory Norice, and Lorrie Faith Cranor. Who is concerned
about what? A study of American, Chinese and Indian users’ privacy
concerns on social network sites. In Trust and trustworthy computing,
pages 146–153. Springer, 2011.
[37] Shabeer Ahmad Wani, Sari M. Rabah, Sara AlFadil, Nancy Dewanjee,
and Yahya Najmi. Efficacy of communication amongst staff members at
plastic and reconstructive surgery section using smartphone and mobile
WhatsApp. Indian Journal of Plastic Surgery, 46:502–505, 2013.
[38] Norhayati Zakaria, Jeffrey M. Stanton, and Shreya T.M. Sarkar-Barney.
Designing and implementing culturally-sensitive IT applications: The
interaction of culture values and privacy issues in the middle east.
Information Technology & People, 16(1):49 – 75, 2003.
8
